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LOCALMULTIDEM

Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants' Social Capital in Europe:
Participation, Organisational Networks, and Public Policies at the Local Level

SPECIFIC TARGETED RESEARCH PROJECT (STREP)

PRIORITY 7: Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society

Deliverable D7_b: Integrated report on Discursive Indicators

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| Dissemination Level | | |
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1. Retrieval method

1.1. Aims and scope

Amongst the starting hypotheses of the LOCALMULTIDEM project was the idea that public discourse impacts upon the forms and degree of migrants' civic and political integration. For example, the analysis of discursive frames might tell which groups are in a better position to become politically integrated within our local polities. To assess these expectations, the study of the impact of local discursive practices on immigrants' (and their descendants') political integration across our cities has been tackled through the analysis of 'discursive interventions' that can be found in reports of main newspapers, drawing on the established method of 'political claims analysis'. Political claims analysis builds on protest event analyses as developed in the field of social movements and collective action, but extends the method to include speech acts and public discourse variables. More simply, protest event analysis takes protest as an indicator of the level of challenges to the political system, while political discourse analysis takes the emergence and public visibility of movement "frames" as an indicator for the "meaning giving" side of challenges to dominant political and cultural norms, values, and problem definitions.

In particular, the two approaches have been integrated by combining the quantitative rigor of protest event analysis with the sensitivity to discursive content of political discourse approaches. *All* forms of public claim-making have been analysed (this being a key difference with protest event analysis), including purely discursive forms such as public statements, press releases and conferences, publications, or interviews, alongside conventional forms of political action (for example, litigation and petitioning) and protest forms. At the same time, we have extended the range of actors to include not just the forms of collective action of particular actors, but simply *any* act of claim-making in our fields of interest, regardless of the actor who made the claim, including the usual suspects of protest event analysis (social movement groups, NGOs, etc.), as well as interest groups (e.g., employers associations or churches), but also political parties, parliamentary, governmental and other state actors.

The dataset has uniformly been built through collection of discursive interventions in each city. As stated in our codebook, each of these discursive interventions is characterised by a typical structure. Specifically, the structure of claims for our study has been broken down into six elements:

1. Location of the claim in time and space (WHEN and WHERE is the claim made?)
2. Claimant: the actor making the claim (WHO makes the claim?)
3. Form of the claim (HOW is the claim inserted in the public sphere?)
4. The addressee of the claim (AT WHOM is the claim directed?)
5. The substantive issue of the claim (WHAT is the claim about?)
6. Object actor: who is or would be affected by the claim (FOR/AGAINST WHOM?)

We have thus focused on key variables that allow us to grasp the discursive interventions in the field of immigration and ethnic relations both at the national and at the local level. That is, all interventions were selected when referring to the country under study.

Reactions abroad to claims occurring in the country of coding have been excluded, alongside with any other claim that has no reference to the country under study. Statements by actors of the country which are made away from the country were coded, together with any other claim by any actor made in the country itself. Claims by international actors that take place in the country have also been coded. Actor, object, addressee, and issue of the discursive intervention are the main variables for data collection and analysis through statistical software. In addition, we have also coded some valuable information on the ‘position towards the object’ so as to evaluate which actors intervene more explicitly in favour or against the interests of migrants.

1.2. Unit of analysis

The units of analysis are instances of claim-making. Drawing on scholarly results of the MERCI project (http://www.wzb.eu/zkd/mit/people/koopmans_recent_projects.en.htm), we have defined an instance of claim making (shorthand: a claim) as a unit of strategic action in the public sphere. As stated in the codebook, this consists of *the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors*. This definition includes political claims regardless of the form in which they are made (statement, violence, repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc.) and regardless of the nature of the actor (governments, social movements, NGOs, individuals, anonymous actors, etc.). It should also be emphasised that here we have singled out repressive measures as special forms of claim-making, namely ones that have direct effects on the objects of the claim and are led almost by definition by institutional actors. This latter ‘institutional bias’ has convinced us that this kind of data, albeit valuable for analyses targeting the policy domain, should not be considered for the specific redaction of this report (which is more concerned with a broad cross-city comparison at the intersection of public and policy domains). In so doing, we follow on the footsteps of MERCI approach, thereby increasing comparability of our findings. Obviously, national teams were free to include repressive measures in their analyses as they best saw fit for the finalisation of city-specific reports.

Our definition of claim-making implies two important delimitations that require some elaboration: (1) instances of claim-making must be the result of purposive strategic action of the claimant and (2) they must be political in nature.

- (1) To qualify as an instance of claim-making, the text had to include a reference to an ongoing or concluded physical or verbal action in the public sphere, i.e. simple attributions of attitudes or opinions to actors by the media or by other actors did not count as claim-making (see codebook for some examples). Verbs indicating action included, e.g., said, stated, demanded, criticised, decided, demonstrated, published, voted, wrote, arrested. Nouns directly referring to such action included, e.g., statement, letter, speech, report, blockade, deportation, decision. The occurrence in the newspaper report of such verbs or nouns was a precondition for the coding of a claim. Reports that only referred to “states of mind” or motivations were not coded

(see codebook for some examples).

- (2) Collected claims had to be ‘political’, in the sense that they had to relate to collective social problems and solutions to them, and not to purely individual strategies of coping with problems (see codebook for some examples).

Statements or actions by different actors were considered to be part of one single instance of claim-making if they took place at the same location in time (the same day) and place (the same locality) and if the actors could be assumed to act as strategic allies. For such cases, our coding scheme allowed for the coding of up to two different claimants. Examples:

- Two substantively identical statements by the same actor on two different days, or on one day in two different localities were considered to be two separate claims. In case of repeated statements or announcements, each one was coded as a separate claim.
- Statements by different speakers during a parliamentary debate or a conference were considered to be part of one instance of claim-making as long as they were substantively and strategically compatible. That is, different speakers were taken together if they all expressed a similar point of view (see codebook for additional examples).

1.3. Sampling rules

We coded all claims reported in the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues of the selected newspapers: *El País* (Madrid), *Népszabadság* (Budapest), *Le Progrès* (Lyon), *Guardian* (London), *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich).¹ In particular, each team has selected a widely distributed high quality city-newspaper (or an equivalent national newspaper with a local section, when a good option was not available at the city level) so as to guarantee full comparability across cases.² Coding focused on political claims relating to immigration, migrant integration, and racism and xenophobia within all main news sections (with the exclusion of ‘editorials’, ‘sport pages’, ‘culture and entertainment pages’, and various ‘specials’). Our codebook also disposed that for migrants’ and extreme right organisations and groups, the coding would also include claims that are not related to immigration issues (e.g., homeland political issues in the case of migrants, or claims on the Nazi regime or the Holocaust in the case of the extreme right). This was done to obtain some valuable information about specific types of collective actors. This type of detailed analysis on specific actors is not included within the broad cross-city comparisons of this report; it can be found, however, under the framework of city reports.

¹ Coding of *El País* has included the Sunday issues (available for this newspaper).

² The only exception refers to the British case, so ca the *Guardian* for the British case. The *Guardian* is a national newspaper which does not produce any kind of ‘local section’. The British Team decided to rely on the *Guardian* due to the substantial overlapping between the local and national spheres of their case, since London 1) is the capital city of Britain, 2) is the most long-standing of migration and minorities integration in the British context, and 3) provides the context for the mobilisation of national actors in what is a very centralised field of contentious politics. At the same time, the British team coded claims for the year 2004 (and not 2006 as it was originally scheduled) as relevant articles were of more immediate availability.

In fact, it should be noted that this report excludes all claims by migrants from the sample when analysing the discursive opportunities for the political integration of migrants so to avoid falling into circular reasoning and blurring dependent and independent variables.

The entire newspaper issue was read throughout its main news sections; that is, we have not made use of electronic searches through key words. If an issue did not appear, the next available issue was taken. If the latter was already part of the sample, the next issue not part of the sample was taken. As stated in our codebook, claims reported in the issue consulted and which had taken place up to two weeks before the date of appearance of that issue were also coded (but only if they had not already been coded). In order to have a significant number of claims, we collected data covering the entire year 2006.

2. Comparative findings

In this part we show the main comparative findings of the analysis of discursive opportunities across the five of the six cities included in the study. While the data for Milan were not available, the data for London refer to 2004 (as they were retrieved prior to the agreement of 2006 as a common date for this workpackage). The presentation of the findings follows the structure of the claim and its main components as outlined above. Specifically, we focus on four such aspects: the actors of claims (including their scope), the forms of claims, the substantive issues of claims (including their scope) and their discursive positions. Due to the low number of cases in some of the cities, we leave out the analysis of addressees, criticised actors, and object actors.

A crucial aspect in claim-making is obviously who has made the claim. If we look at the actors of claims, we observe important variations across the five cities (table 1). To begin with, state and party actors are more present in public debates in immigration and ethnic relations politics in certain cities than in others. In particular, in London, Zurich and especially Madrid the share of claims made by state and party actors is larger than that of civil society actors, while the ratio is reversed in Budapest and Lyon, although in the latter two cities the difference is not very important. In Budapest we also find more unknown actors, perhaps as a sign of the lower degree of institutionalisation of this field in this city which do not belong to the traditional immigration countries.

Yet the most significant differences are found in the more specific categories of actors. Thus, we can see that governments (regardless of the political-administrative level) are particularly active in Madrid, followed by Lyon, London and Zurich, while they are much less so in Budapest. State intervention in immigration and ethnic relations politics is therefore particularly intense in the Spanish city, at least in the year for which we retrieved the data. Legislative and political parties are quite present in public debates in London, Madrid and especially Zurich, less in Lyon and especially much less in Budapest. Among institutional actors, the role of state executive agencies is particularly important in Budapest, much less in the other cities and especially so in Lyon.

Table 1: Actors of claims by city (percentages)

| | Budapest | London | Lyon | Madrid | Zurich |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| State and party actors | 39.5 | 62.1 | 45.2 | 75.5 | 62.5 |
| Governments | 4.7 | 19.3 | 25.2 | 43.4 | 18.8 |
| Legislatives and political parties | 7.0 | 20.6 | 13.9 | 21.8 | 30.2 |
| Judiciary | 0.0 | 7.3 | 3.2 | 0.8 | 4.2 |
| State executive agencies | 27.9 | 15.0 | 2.9 | 9.5 | 9.4 |
| Civil society actors | 46.5 | 34.9 | 51.6 | 24.3 | 31.8 |
| Socioeconomic interest groups | 0.0 | 3.0 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 3.1 |
| Migrants and minorities | 4.7 | 6.3 | 14.2 | 5.4 | 5.7 |
| Extreme-right and racist actors | 9.3 | 0.3 | 3.4 | 1.2 | 4.2 |
| Antiracist and pro-minority groups | 9.3 | 7.0 | 18.3 | 5.6 | 3.6 |
| Other civil society groups | 23.3 | 18.3 | 11.2 | 8.0 | 15.1 |
| Unknown actors | 14.0 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 0.2 | 5.7 |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 43 | 301 | 409 | 514 | 192 |

Among civil society actors, we should note a much larger presence of migrants and minorities in Lyon, as compared to the other cities. This in part confirms and in part contradicts the available literature on claims-making in the field of migration and ethnic relations. In the literature, migrants are found to be more present in public debates in France, whose conception of citizenship is characterised by universalism, than in Switzerland, where it gets closer to assimilationism. On the other hand, however, Britain is usually characterised by the largest share of claim-making in the field. Thus, our findings on London do not reflect fully the national situation in Britain; similarly, Lyon is to some extent a special case in France owing to its particularly strong presence of migrants and minorities in public debates. Although findings reinforce one of the starting points of the LOCALMULTIDEM project (that the local context needs to be singled out as it does not necessarily overlap with the national context), we are aware that our results need to take into consideration the fact that a national paper (The Guardian) has been used to code the British data.

Extreme-right and racist actors are more present in Budapest, where they amount to nearly one tenth of all claims in the field. This is another sign of the particularly closed discursive opportunity structures for migrants in this city. They are followed at a distance by their counterparts in Zurich and Lyon, while London and Madrid provide a more open context in this regard. On the other end of the pro-migrant/anti-migrant continuum, antiracist and pro-minority groups are very much present in Lyon. This reflects the strength of antiracism in France, where it has a long tradition facilitated by the universalist and egalitarian conception of citizenship in this country. These actors, in contrast, play a less important role in the other cities, but especially so in Madrid and Zurich.

The actors of claims can have a different scope. The notion of scope refers to the organisational extension of the organisation or institution. In other words, this refers to the political-administrative or territorial level to which the actor belongs. The results are straightforward: the overwhelming majority of claims were made by national or subnational actors and only a small part of them come from supranational or international

actors (table 2). This seems to confirm the thesis that it is at best too early to assert that the public discourses on immigration have transcended the national state. European actors are somewhat more present in London and Madrid, and other supranational actors have a bit more space in Budapest, but overall national and subnational actors have by far the lion's share. Indeed, public debates in Madrid are to a smaller extent made by national or subnational actors than in the other four cities.

Table 2: Scope of actors of claims by city (percentages)

| | Budapest | London | Lyon | Madrid | Zurich |
|-------------------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| European | 0.0 | 4.0 | 1.0 | 6.1 | 1.7 |
| Other supranational | 5.3 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 2.9 |
| Foreign-based/bilateral | 2.6 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 5.7 | 2.9 |
| National or subnational | 92.1 | 92.9 | 98.8 | 85.7 | 92.5 |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 38 | 297 | 407 | 510 | 174 |

The literature on social movements and contentious politics has long stressed the constraining impact of the political and institutional context on the forms taken by collective mobilisations and claim-making. The concept of political opportunity structures has proved particularly helpful in this. In this perspective, open political opportunity structures favour more moderate forms of action, while closed ones encourage challengers to adopt more radical action repertoires. Closer to our subject matter, scholarship has shown that different configurations or models of citizenship (i.e. different collective definitions or conceptions of citizenship and national identity) impinge upon the forms of claims by actors intervening in immigration and ethnic relations politics.

Our data show that a large majority of claims take the form of public statements (table 3), as at least three quarters and up to nearly all the claims are public statements.³ At the same time, we observe variations across cities. Thus, the field is more contentious in Budapest and Lyon. In these two cities the share of conventional political actions (e.g., indoor meetings, judicial actions, direct-democratic actions, petitioning) is significantly higher than in the other three cities. The same holds for demonstrative protests (e.g., mass demonstrations, rallies). Finally, confrontational protests (e.g., illegal demonstrations, strikes, occupations, blockades) and violent forms (in this field, often taking the form of physical attacks by extreme-right and racist groups addressed to migrants) are only rarely used, and slightly more frequently so in Budapest. The latter appears then as the most closed or hostile discursive context in the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics among our five cities.

³ It is important to note that these include political decisions. Here we chose to merge them together for practical reasons, but also because political decisions are in a way a special case of public statement to the extent that they are communicated in the public domain.

Table 3: Forms of claims (percentages)

| | Budapest | London | Lyon | Madrid | Zurich |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| Public statements | 76.7 | 97.6 | 81.2 | 94.5 | 92.1 |
| Conventional political actions | 9.3 | 1.0 | 8.1 | 2.1 | 2.6 |
| Demonstrative protests | 9.3 | 0.3 | 9.3 | 1.8 | 3.1 |
| Confrontational protests | 2.3 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.2 | 1.0 |
| Violent protests | 2.3 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 1.4 | 1.0 |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 43 | 301 | 409 | 514 | 192 |

Note: Public statements include political decisions.

The substantive content of claims is another core aspect of claim-making. At the most general level, we can look at the three main issue fields that form the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics: immigration, asylum, and aliens; minority integration; and antiracism, xenophobia, and inter-ethnic relations.⁴ Once again, we observe important variations across the five cities under study (table 4). Firstly, issues pertaining to immigration, asylum, and aliens politics (i.e. the regulation of immigration flows) are prevailing in Madrid, while they are much less central – although far from marginal – in public debates in Budapest, with the three other cities standing somewhere in-between. Secondly, and partly related to that, issues relating to minority integration politics (i.e. the regulation of resident migrants) are comparatively more important in Budapest, London, and Zurich than in Lyon and especially Zurich. Thirdly, issues concerning anti-racism, xenophobia, and inter-ethnic relations are much more frequently addressed in Budapest and in part also in Lyon than in the other three cities. However, this tells us nothing about the closeness of political opportunity structures in the Hungarian city, as this only refers to the thematic focus of the claims, not to their orientations (pro-migrant or anti-migrant). For that we will need to look at the position of actors towards claims (see below).

Table 4: Issues of claims (percentages)

| | Budapest | London | Lyon | Madrid | Zurich |
|---|-----------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| Immigration, asylum, aliens politics | 27.9 | 49.8 | 45.0 | 69.3 | 48.4 |
| Residence rights and recognition | 4.7 | 1.3 | 25.4 | 4.9 | 29.7 |
| Entry and exit | 14.0 | 3.7 | 2.2 | 18.7 | 1.6 |
| Institutional framework and costs | 2.3 | 7.0 | 1.7 | 14.2 | 3.1 |
| Other | 7.0 | 37.9 | 15.6 | 31.5 | 14.1 |
| Minority integration politics | 37.2 | 38.9 | 29.1 | 23.0 | 40.1 |
| Citizenship and political rights | 0.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 6.2 | 9.4 |
| Social rights | 7.0 | 2.7 | 5.9 | 4.1 | 6.3 |
| Religious and cultural rights | 0.0 | 5.3 | 9.3 | 3.9 | 11.5 |
| Discrimination and unequal treatment | 18.6 | 20.9 | 4.9 | 1.6 | 3.1 |
| Minority social problems | 9.3 | 4.7 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 4.7 |
| Other/general integration issues | 2.3 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 5.2 |
| Antiracism, xenophobia, and inter-ethnic relations | 34.9 | 11.3 | 25.9 | 7.8 | 11.5 |
| Institutional racism | 11.6 | 6.6 | 6.1 | 2.5 | 2.1 |
| Non-institutional racism and xenophobia | 23.3 | 4.3 | 18.6 | 5.3 | 9.4 |

⁴ Inter-ethnic relations could also be classified as part of minority integration politics. Here, however, we prefer to put them together with antiracism and xenophobia to be consistent with previous classifications in the literature.

| | Budapest | London | Lyon | Madrid | Zurich |
|------------------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| Inter-ethnic conflicts | 0.0 | 0.3 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 43 | 301 | 409 | 514 | 192 |

At a more specific level, we can examine the distribution of claims within each of these three general issue fields.⁵ We can once again point out at a number of differences that can be observed across cities. To begin with, most claims in Lyon and Zurich deal with residence rights and recognition, while these issues are much less frequent in the other three cities. Issues concerning entry and exit from the country are particularly frequent in Budapest and Madrid. In the latter city we also observe a fair amount of claims dealing with institutional framework and costs issues. In London and Madrid, most claims address other issues concerning immigration, asylum, and alien politics, most notably general evaluation or policy direction. Citizenship and political rights issues play a role especially in Zurich and partly also in Madrid, while they are absent from the public debates in Budapest. Social rights issues are more or less equally distributed across the five cities, with the exception of Budapest, where they are addressed less frequently. Religious and cultural rights issues are more important in Lyon and Zurich, and again absent from public debates in Budapest. The results concerning discrimination and unequal treatment issues are more clear-cut: in two of the five cities (Budapest and London), these claims dealing with these issues are among the most frequent ones overall, while they play a more marginal role in the other three cities. Issues relating to minority social problems are quite important in Budapest, much less so in the other cities, witnessing the difficult situation with regard to minority integration politics there. Finally, we can see that in the two cities in which issues pertaining to antiracism, xenophobia, and interethnic relations are salient, it is above all a matter of noninstitutional racism and xenophobia.

In addition to the scope of actors, issues also vary in their scope. Here we refer to the geographical and/or political scope of the claim. Scope here refers to the actors, actions, legislation or conventions that are implied in the claim. Again, most of the claims have a national or subnational scope (table 5). Furthermore, just as for the scope of actors, public debates in London and especially Madrid are characterised by a higher share of issues with a European scope. In this case, the situation in Madrid as compared to the other four cities in terms of the lesser importance of the national or subnational level is even more pronounced, be it either in terms of European or other supranational issues or in terms of international ones.

Table 5: Scope of issues of claims (percentages)

| | Budapest | London | Lyon | Madrid | Zurich |
|-------------------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| European | 0.0 | 6.6 | 0.7 | 11.5 | 1.1 |
| Other supranational | 2.4 | 0.3 | 2.0 | 6.2 | 1.6 |
| International relations | 2.4 | 3.3 | 1.7 | 9.6 | 3.2 |
| National or subnational | 95.1 | 89.7 | 95.6 | 72.7 | 94.2 |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N | 41 | 301 | 409 | 513 | 190 |

⁵ This is only one among many other ways to classify the issues of claims.

The issues of claims only give us the thematic priorities in public debates on immigration and ethnic relations politics. In order to assess the policy direction of such issues we need to look at the position of actors towards claims. We do so by means of the average discursive positions of issues in this field (table 6).⁶ This indicator will also be used to measure discursive opportunity structures when assessing their impact on the political participation of migrants (see below). In this regard, the overall average discursive positions suggest that Budapest offers the more closed context in this regard, followed closely by Zurich. London, Madrid and especially Lyon, in contrast, offer a much more open discursive context. This pattern is consistent with the other indicators of openness or closeness of the discursive opportunity structures examined earlier. At the same time, however, it varies across actors. Generally speaking, state and party actors tend to have a more negative stance than civil society actors. This is perhaps unavoidable as they are in charge of regulating migration and therefore must often take restrictive measures, especially in times of strong migratory pressure.

Table 6: Average discursive positions (means)

| | Budapest | London | Lyon | Madrid | Zurich |
|--|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| State and party actors | -.24 (17) | .26 (187) | .26 (185) | .30 (382) | -.03 (120) |
| Governments | .00 (2) | .29 (58) | .24 (103) | .31 (219) | .03 (36) |
| Legislatives and political parties | -1.00 (3) | .03 (62) | .39 (57) | .23 (111) | -.17 (58) |
| Judiciary | - | .55 (22) | .08 (13) | .25 (4) | .38 (8) |
| State executive agencies | -.08 (12) | .40 (45) | .08 (12) | .42 (48) | .11 (18) |
| Civil society actors | .10 (20) | .42 (105) | .69 (203) | .67 (124) | .52 (61) |
| Socioeconomic interest groups | - | .11 (9) | .61 (18) | .25 (20) | .33 (6) |
| Migrants and minorities | 1.00 (2) | .63 (19) | .75 (51) | .93 (28) | .91 (11) |
| Extreme-right and racist actors | -1.00 (4) | -1.00 (1) | -.93 (14) | -1.00 (5) | -1.00 (8) |
| Antiracist and pro-minority groups | 1.00 (4) | .81 (21) | .96 (75) | 1.00 (29) | .86 (7) |
| Other civil society groups | .00 (10) | .27 (55) | .73 (45) | .67 (42) | .76 (29) |
| Unknown actors (and private individuals) | .20 (5) | .11 (9) | .69 (13) | 1.00 (1) | .27 (11) |
| Overall average | -.02 (42) | .31 (301) | .50 (401) | .39 (507) | .16 (192) |
| Average without 'migrants and minorities' ⁷ | -.07 (40) | .29 (282) | .45 (350) | .36 (479) | .12 (181) |

Note: N between parentheses.

⁶ This variable provides a general indicator of the position of claims with regard to the rights, position and evaluation of migrants and minorities (and, conversely, of those who mobilise against them). All claims whose realisation implies a deterioration in the rights or position of migrants or minorities receive code -1, no matter if the reduction is minor or large. The -1 also goes to claims which express a negative attitude with regard to migrants or minorities (both verbal and physical) or a positive attitude with regard to xenophobic and extreme right groups or aims. All claims whose realisation implies an improvement in the rights and position of migrants (minor or major) receive code 1. This code also goes to claims expressing (verbally or physically) a positive attitude with regard to migrants, or a negative attitude with regard to xenophobic and extreme right groups or aims. Neutral or ambivalent claims, which are not necessarily related to any deterioration or improvement in migrants' position or rights and do not express a clear attitude with regard to migrants and minorities or their opponents receive code 0.

⁷ This measure provides the final summary indicator of discursive opportunities which will be proposed as a predictor of migrants' integration at the individual level in occasion of final Joint Report of Localmultidem project. As it has been said in section 1.3, claims by migrants and minorities need to be excluded from the sample when analysing the discursive opportunities for migrants' political integration so to avoid falling into circular reasoning and blurring dependent and independent variables.

Yet here we are more interested in showing variations across cities. State and party actors have a particularly negative discourse in Budapest and Zurich, while they are more open in the other three cities. Among them, we should emphasise the quite open position of legislative and political parties in Madrid and especially Lyon as opposed to London and especially Zurich (even more so in Budapest, but based on only 3 cases), the quite open position of the judiciary in London and partly also in Madrid and Zurich (no data available for Budapest), and the open position of state executive agencies in London and Madrid as compared to the other three cities.

Civil society actors also have a less positive discourse in Budapest than in all other four cities. The most open contexts in this regard are provided by Lyon and Madrid. Let us focus on the three actors who are at the core of the immigration and ethnic relations political field: migrants and minorities, extreme-right and racist actors, and anti-racist and pro-minority groups. Migrants and minorities obviously display a very positive discourse as they are most directly concerned with the claims and their realisation. By contrast, the extreme-right and racist actors have quite the opposite position and show a very negative discourse. Finally, antiracist and pro-migrant groups also have a very positive discourse, with little variation across the five cities. In sum, differences across cities in the discursive position of civil society actors are much less pronounced than for state and party actors. It is therefore among the latter (i.e. at the institutional level) that different discursive opportunity structures emerge.

3. Linking institutional and discursive opportunities

In this part we move from a simple descriptive analysis of discourse to a more comprehensive framework for linking institutional and discursive opportunities. Specifically, in this context we are interested in combining and distinguishing at the same time the specific role of discursive opportunities vis-à-vis more classic institutional variables. Hence, we use the indicators retrieved in the part of the project devoted to the institutional political opportunity structure. These indicators have been unpacked into four main strands, namely, individual rights, group rights, general political opportunity structure, and specific opportunity structure (see WP1 integrated report). Combinations of (different strands of) institutional and discursive opportunities, we argue, need to be assessed in further details so as to refine our analysis of political opportunities at the macro- level. This is a necessary step in view of the final Joint Report for the Localmultidem project: in this occasion, political opportunities, both institutional and discursive, can be taken as an independent *explanans* to account for findings about political participation and trust of individual migrants from population survey (see WP4 integrated report). Indeed, it should be emphasised that standard approaches in the scholarly field – albeit stressing the impact of the institutionalised political system – have largely overlooked more cultural contextual variables such as discursive opportunities. In addition, scholarly work has looked at the role of political opportunities for explaining collective action, focusing much less on how they influence individual participation and behaviour of individual migrants.

Specific information referring to different strands of institutional opportunities enables us to enter the debate over “individual rights vs. group rights” and over the role of specific opportunities for migrants which are not under the strict control of nation state. As regards discursive opportunities, we use here data for the position of claims towards migrants and their descendents. Measures refer to the average discursive positions in the whole migration and ethnic field: as it has been said, they range from -1 to +1: the closer the score is to 1, the more favourable is the discursive position, and hence, the discursive opportunities for the political participation of migrants and their descendents. Table 7 provides the summary scores for both the institutional and the discursive sides of political opportunities.

Table 7: Summary scores for the political opportunity structures in the five cities

| | Budapest | London | Lyon | Madrid | Zurich |
|-------------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|
| Individual rights | -.18/-.20/-.20 | .13/.13/.13 | .22/.29/.06 | .01/.06/.06 | -.09/-.24/-.24 |
| Collective rights | -.13/-.43/-.22 | .23/.47/.47 | .08/.08/.08 | .25/.33/.33 | .05/.05/.05 |
| General POS | .32 | -.13 | .04 | .30 | .15 |
| Specific POS | -.53 | .62 | -.47 | .17 | .25 |
| Discursive POS | -.07 (40) | .29 (282) | .45 (350) | .36 (479) | .12 (181) |

Note: Scores in Budapest refer to ethnic Hungarians, Chinese, and Muslims respectively; in Geneva scores refer to Kosovars and Italians; in London scores refer to Bangladeshi, Indians, and Afro-Caribbeans respectively; finally in Lyon scores refer to Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans respectively.

The data show an extensive variation along the two distinct sides of political opportunities. While some relevant variations affect also distinct cultural groups within a same national space, cross-national variation is the most noticeable. In particular, variations allow for disposing each case along the continuum made of “closed”, “relatively open”, and “open” opportunities. These three scenarios are quite common in the works of scholars of political opportunities, who have usually agreed that the sudden “opening” of sizeable opportunities leads more often to actors’ mobilisation. Table 8 sums up these three scenarios across cities and groups,⁸ offering some valuable information that can be easily combined across the discursive-institutional divide.


Table 8: General assessment of the political opportunity structures in the five cities

| | Budapest | London | Lyon | Madrid | Zurich |
|-------------------|-----------------|---------------|---|---------------|---------------|
| Individual rights | closed | rel. open | open (Alg/Tun) rel. open (Mor) | rel. open | closed |
| Collective Rights | closed | open | rel. open | open | rel. open |
| General POS | open | closed | rel. open | open | rel. open |
| Specific POS | closed | open | closed | rel. open | open |
| Discursive POS | closed | open | open | open | rel. open |

⁸ The general assessment of political opportunity structures was made according to the following thresholds: a negative score means closed, a positive score up to 0.20 means relatively open, and a positive score above 0.20 means open.


Looking at the specific situation in each of the five cities included in our analysis, we can see the particularly unfavourable political context faced by migrants in Budapest (where only the general POS is open), as compared to the other four cities. This holds both with regard to institutional and discursive opportunities. On the other end of the openness-closeness continuum, London and Madrid present the most favourable situation, in terms of the more open opportunity structures for the political participation of migrants. Zurich presents an intermediary situation, while Lyon stands out as a particularly interesting case since it combines a strong closeness in the specific opportunity structures with an extreme openness at the discursive level. This shows, among other things, that the institutional and discursive dimensions of the political opportunity structures do not necessarily go hand in hand, but often co-vary in different ways, thus reinforcing one of the starting point of the LOCALMULTIDEM project: political opportunity structures are indeed made of a complex combinations of institutional and discursive variables.

Table 9: Combining Opportunities (general vs specific)



Lastly, we can finally move to a more precise understanding of potential combinations of institutional and discursive variables. Tables 9 and 10 single out first of all the combinations amongst different strands of institutional opportunities, focusing on two lines of divide in the literature, namely, between national and local level, and between individual and group rights.

Table 10: Combining Opportunities (individ. vs. coll.ve)




On the one hand, it is clear that the LOCALMULTIDEM project has engaged with important dynamics at the local level, that need to be considered beyond the scope of central institutions. Variations are clearly more noticeable along the axis of specific POS (with positions stretching until the poles of the axis) than along the axis of general POS. On the other hand, our data seem to confirm some gradual convergence in Europe in terms of individual and group rights. In spite of substantial cross-national distinctions that remain along the two axes, our cities are not too far from each other when considering the whole area.

Table 11 singles out the effect of discursive opportunities vis-à-vis the institutional side of political opportunities. This latter is expressed through use of specific POS owing to its key role in terms of cross-city variations. As it has been said, the data show that the institutional and discursive dimensions of the political opportunity structures do not necessarily go hand in hand, but co-vary in different ways. Specific POS stands still as the most important axis in terms of cross-city variation, but it can provide further insights when it is evaluated side by side with variations across the discursive axis. In particular, our results seem to indicate that the four main ideal-types that are identifiable at the corners of the whole area (a combination of open institutions and closed discourse; a combination of closed institutions and open discourse; a purely closed/open situation along both structures of opportunities) are empirically filled in, at least to some extent, by

the respective position of our cities. Undoubtedly, the opposition of London and Lyon in terms of specific POS (while sharing a similar discursive structure), or again the opposition between Lyon and Budapest in terms of discourse (while sharing a similar position in terms of specific POS) call for a more extensive reflection on the specific impact of combinations of opportunities on migrants' integration.

Table 11: Combining Opportunities (instit. vs discursive)



4. Conclusions

This report has focused on a series of descriptive analyses investigating different aspects of the discursive contexts of migrants and their descendents across five cities of our project. In particular, we have engaged with key variables that allow for grasping the discursive interventions in the field of immigration and ethnic relations both at the national and at the local level. Our analysis of actors has shown that in London, Zurich and especially Madrid the share of claims made by state and party actors is larger than that of civil society actors, while the ratio is reversed in Budapest and Lyon. Important differences, however, seem to emerge only once the specific categories are taken into consideration. As regards the forms of claims, we have found that the field is much more contentious in Budapest and Lyon, where the share of direct political actions and confrontation is significantly higher than in the other three cities. Important variations across the five cities also concerned the substantive issues of claims under study, with issues pertaining to immigration and aliens politics being relevant especially in Madrid, issues relating to minority integration politics being relevant in London, and issues

concerning anti-racism being relevant in Lyon. A key variable of investigation for assessing cross-city variations has been the position of the claim in terms of its effect, real or potential, on the situation of migrants and their descendents. Hence, we have found that state and party actors have a particularly negative discourse in Budapest and Zurich, while they are more open in the other three cities. The situation is not too different when focusing on civil society actors: they also have a less positive discourse in Budapest, with open contexts in London, Lyon and Madrid.

An additional crucial step of our investigation has combined the analysis of discourse with that of institutional opportunities from WP1. We have thus identified a space made of four main situations: migrants could face a political context that is generous both in terms of institutional access and discursive opportunities; they could alternatively face a very constraining context which is closed along the two axes of opportunities; a third possibility combines openness of institutions with overall stigma within public discourse; lastly, the latter could be open but institutional access only very limited. What is more, we have worked out this variations empirically, rather than in a top-down theoretical approach; that is, we know already that our cities fit with the different situations, even with those that may seem more unlikely (as in the case of closed institutions and open discourse).

Ultimately, our analysis has opened up space for further research on the impact of political contexts of host societies upon the integration of migrants and their descendents. As we have said, the final Joint Report of the LOCALMULTIDEM project will take responsibility for integrating data at the macro- and micro- level from different workpackages of the research. In fact, one of the of main challenges is to appraise the influence of political opportunities, if any, on trust and behaviour of individual migrants. Yet, our findings seem to show already that different dimensions of political opportunities cannot just be considered as additional layers, to be taken just one after the other. Discourse and institutions may not simply “add up”, but they may interact into complex combinations that change altogether the quality of the political milieu that migrants and their descendents face in their own cities.